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Constitutional Afterlife:
The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s Post-Political Constitution
Tom Ginsburg∗

Forthcoming, International Journal of Constitutional Law, January 2009

Thailand’s constitution of 1997 introduced profound changes into the
country’s governance, creating a “postpolitical” democratic structure in
which an intricate array of guardian institutions served to limit the role of
elected

politicians.

Ultimately,

the

constitutional

structure

was

undermined in a military coup against populist billionaire Thaksin
Shinawatra, who had taken over many of the institutions designed to
constrain political power. Nonetheless, the 1997 constitution appears to
be having a significant afterlife, in that its institutional innovations have
survived the enactment of a new Constitution and continue to constrain
the political process. This article describes the Thai situation and
speculates on the conditions for constitutional afterlife.

On September 19, 2006, General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin of the Thai military led a
bloodless coup while the country’s controversial prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra,
was in New York, participating in the annual opening debate of the United Nations
General Assembly. The next day, the self-proclaimed National Administrative Reform
Council abolished the 1997 constitution. Thus ended an experiment in constitutional
design that had been devised to overcome Thailand’s chronic problems of political
corruption and instability, and had been heralded as an innovation in Asian
∗
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constitutionalism more generally. As Thailand’s political crisis continues under its new
2007 Constitution, this article considers the impact of the 1997 document and argues that,
notwithstanding its premature death, the document is likely to continue to exert
significant influence in Thai politics.
The Thai constitution of 1997 (B.E. 2540) exemplified a recent trend in
constitutional drafting that is best characterized as post-political. The post-political
constitution involves enhanced efforts to structure and channel democratic power and to
limit the role of partisanship, encompassing not only constitutional courts but myriad
other institutions that effect a highly refined separation of powers.1 Thailand’s 1997
document featured a complex set of “guardian” institutional safeguards against legislative
overreaching, constructed in nested institutions of mutual checks and balances. Not only
did the constitution establish an array of independent oversight institutions, each with an
intricate appointment mechanism, but it also included a nonpartisan elected body, the
Senate, which played a central role in appointing the oversight institutions and was
thought to guarantee insulation from the allegedly corrupting influence of political
parties.
This elaborately structured edifice of constraints on politics was, in the end,
unable to withstand the political influences of Thaksin’s billionaire populism. Postpolitical constitutions, the Thai example suggests, are hardly capable of restraining
politics but, nonetheless, may transform it in novel ways. Indeed, one might speculate
that post-political constitutions risk politicizing institutions with technocratic bases of
legitimacy, overloading them with tasks they are not designed or prepared to handle. In
1

See FRANK VIBERT, THE RISE OF THE UNELECTED: DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633
(2000).
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the case of Thailand, the guardian institutions became vulnerable to hidden influence
from the prime minister, who was willing to use an array of tools to perpetuate his power.
This triggered forces that killed the 1997 constitution at the age of nine.
But the formal death of the constitution did not terminate the various independent
guardian agencies that it established. Most of these remained functional during the entire
period of the coup and interim constitution, notwithstanding the lack of a formal legal
basis for their authority, and were thus well-positioned to help usher in the current
Constitution, with its slightly restructured but still heavily technocratic arrangements,
which was adopted by referendum in August 2007. This suggests the notion of the
constitutional afterlife, the impact of a text beyond the formal survival of a constitution
as a legally binding document.
Constitutional afterlife provides a novel way of thinking about constitutional
impact. Traditionally, we think about the impact of constitutions in terms of the efficacy
of their formal provisions. We imagine that constitutions matter when there is congruence
between text and practice, and do not matter when such congruence is lacking. We might
ask, for example, whether rights promised in the text are actually observed in fact, or
whether institutions set up by a constitution operate within its constraints.2 Another
criterion for success or failure might be endurance of the formal text, or the ability of a
constitutional regime to deliver political goods such as economic growth and democratic
stability.3 The Thai example suggests that constitutions might also matter for their
enduring institutional innovations. Constitutional afterlife may be particularly important

2
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Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are They More
than Mere 'Window Dressing?" 55 POL. RES. Q. 111 (2002).
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manuscript, on file with authors).
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for the study of constitutionalism in unstable political environments.4 While modern Thai
history does not bode well for the long-term survival of the current constitutional
document, institutional endurance alone marks a significant step toward stability, and the
legacy of 1997 may continue to make a difference for Thai governance.

1. Thailand’s Constitutional Graveyard
1.1. History
The Kingdom of Siam was an absolute monarchy until 1932, when a group of young
army officers led a bloodless coup d’état and established a constitutional monarchy.
Those behind the new system were not republicans: they undertook their revolution while
addressing the king as subjects and insisting that he had the final decision on whether to
allow the establishment of constitutional government.5 The political forces behind the
coup included both right-wing elements in the military and bureaucracy, and left-wing
nationalists clustered around the intellectual Pridi Banomyong. The tension between the
two (and with a third group, royalists who eventually aligned with the military in 1957)
has arguably dominated Thai politics, in one form or another, for seven decades.
Pridi was an anticolonial nationalist, of the same generation and orientation as
Aung San, Nehru, and Ho Chi Minh. Unlike those figures, however, he faced not a
departing colonial power but a more complex domestic environment in which the very
nature of the state was highly contested.6 Pridi was one of the major drafters of the 1932
constitution, which promised direct elections once half the citizens had completed

4

See also GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
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primary education.7 But when his economic plan included elements of nationalization, he
was labeled a communist, and successive coups by the military and royalists followed,
until politics stabilized under antiroyalist General Plaek (Phibun) Phibunsongkhram.
Phibun aligned with Japan during World War II, and changed the name of the country
from Siam to Thailand.8 After the war, Pridi became the country’s first elected prime
minister, but Phibun soon managed to regain power, exiling Pridi. Phibun was deposed in
turn by another coup in 1957, in which royalist elements allied with the army under Field
Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The following five decades witnessed an oscillation between
military rule and civilian government, accompanied by frequent constitutional change.
In seventy-six years since the establishment of the constitutional monarchy,
Thailand has had eighteen constitutions, somewhere between seventeen and twenty-three
coups and coup attempts, and fifty-six governments.9 The pattern of constitution-making
seems to have involved cycling among a relatively small number of institutional variants.
The 1932 constitution, for example, was the basis for the 1952 document, just as the 1997
constitution was the basis for the 2007 document. One of the chief axes of constitutional
change has been whether the National Assembly, particularly the upper house or Senate,
is to be elected or appointed by the government, military, or king. Because of their
ephemeral quality, Thai constitutions do little to constrain those in power in accordance
with the constitutionalist ideal. Still, the very fact that constitutions are repeatedly

7
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promulgated suggests that they are playing some role in legitimating power-holders, and
may reflect what one scholar describes as an “almost mystical faith that the promulgation
of modern codes, statutes and constitutions would somehow produce a modern
Thailand.”10

1.2. The Unwritten Constitution
As in every country, underlying the formal constitutional text of the day in Thailand is a
set of informal norms and rules that constrains the exercise of political power.11 The
unwritten constitution forms a daunting challenge for comparative research, as it lacks
the clarity and definitiveness that we associate with legal rules, but is particularly helpful
for understanding Thailand, where formal rules are unstable. Real constitutional
constraint comes from unwritten constitutional norms, particularly those concerning the
role of the country’s long-ruling and widely respected monarch, King Bhumibol
Adulyadej, who took the throne after the still-unsolved murder of his brother in 1946.12
The unwritten constitutional status of the king did not emerge automatically in
1932, but was the result of decades of political battles between the monarchy, elected
politicians, and the military. In 1956, for example, the king made a veiled criticism of the

10

David M. Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn, in 9
MICHIGAN PAPERS ON SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (Center for S. & Se. Asian Studies, Univ. Mich
1975).
11
See HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Kennikat 1925);
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1890); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J. 100 (2008), for
treatments of the unwritten American Constitution. See also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007).
12
See generally, HANDLEY supra note 5; Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy,
in 3 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ASIA 305 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., Lynne Riener 1989).
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military junta, provoking a strong reaction from Phibun that threatened royal autonomy.13
Since Sarit’s coup in 1957, however, the palace has gradually expanded its authority, and
the royally endorsed coup has become a standard feature of Thai politics. It was most
apparent in 1981, when coup leaders moved against Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond (a
former general) and took over much of Bangkok. The king’s refusal to grant the leaders
an audience was crucial in undermining the coup, which collapsed after three days.14
The king has developed ties with all the powerful groups in society, and the
monarchy has established itself as the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts, sharing power
with the politicians, bureaucrats, and generals who run the country on a day-to-day basis.
The monarchy has remained a stabilizing factor, aloof from politics and yet intervening at
crucial times to keep the system in some semblance of balance. This role has been played
as a matter of informal politics rather than formal institutional authority. For example, the
formal powers given to the king in the 1997 text were perhaps greater than what is
accorded in comparable European constitutional monarchies, but not formidable.15 In
reality, the king’s frequent though elliptical interventions in politics have meant that
governance was bound by informal as well as formal constraints.16 At times, however, the
monarch’s interventions have gone well beyond his limited formal role. For example, in
1992, King Bhumibol appointed technocrat Anand Panyrachun as prime minister over

13

HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 134.
Kobkua Suwannathat, The Monarchy and Constitutional Change Since 1972, in REFORMING THAI
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elected MP Somboon Rahong, who had been nominated by the parliament. The choice
was widely accepted, despite its utter lack of constitutional basis.17
An incomplete listing of the unwritten constitutional rules is as follows: the
monarch, head of state, is highly respected and will limit his interventions in the political
sphere.18 However, on the occasions when he exercises his power, he will be respected.
The military can step in to resolve perceived crises, and coups are a perfectly acceptable
method of leadership change. However, coup-makers should always seek a private
blessing from the throne before, and a public one immediately after, any coup.19
Meanwhile, violence against the people is rarely, if ever, legitimate,20 and no political
force is entitled to excessively restrict the freedoms of the people. Furthermore, there
seems to be a constitutional understanding now that coup leaders should restore
democracy by promising new elections and a new constitution. The coup leaders
invariably promulgate a new interim text—the fact that Thailand has had so many
constitutions attests to the tradition of blessing coups in this fashion. As one commentator
has observed, Thailand has accepted constitutional processes without accepting
constitutional ideals and practices, repeatedly adopting new texts that fail to endure or
constrain.21

17

Kobkua Suwannathat, The Monarchy and Constitutional Change since 1972, in REFORMING THAI
POLITICS, supra note 14, at 57, 61, 65.
18
James Ockey, Monarch, Monarchy, Succession, and Stability in Thailand, 46 ASIA PAC. VIEWPOINT 115
(2005) (monarch has institutionalized his influence to a great degree).
19
Even the antiroyalist Phibun Phibunsongkram sought the king’s formal approval. HANDLEY, supra note
5, at 91. In 1977, the Kriengsak coup did not seek go-ahead approval in advance, and was not received
warmly by the king. Id. at 267–268.
20
HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 267 (“Coups by this time were accepted among large parts of the Thai elite as
a natural political change, especially if they were not violent.”). Bhumibol criticized the coup makers and
the protesters in 1973, 1976 and 1992.
21
Kanok Wongtrangan, Executive Power and Constitutionalism in Thailand, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES 287, 289 (Carmelo V. Sison ed., Academy of ASEAN Law and
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The unwritten constraints, however, ensure that Thai authoritarianism is, in
relative terms, not very authoritarian.22 Compared with neighboring Myanmar or
Indonesia, repression by the Thai military has been relatively mild, even in its darkest
hours. One can conclude that, though proceeding from a different historical tradition from
Western

liberal

constitutionalism,

Thai

society

operates

on

the

basis

of

quasiconstitutional understandings of limitation on government that do not proceed from
a written text.
The monarch does not view constitutions as enduring or permanent institutions
that constrain and channel power; in fact, he has spoken of constitutions as foreign
imports, based on textbook notions of democracy that are not appropriate for Thailand’s
unique political culture.23 Drawing on the Buddhist idea of impermanence, the king has
emphasized that unworkable institutions can easily be changed and that constitutions are
impermanent human creations.24 Thailand’s constitutional monarchy thus differs
significantly from that of the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. There, constitutional
monarchy suggests that both constitution and monarch are enduring, and that the former
constrains the latter. The monarch is the embodiment of the nation, but not a force in
politics. In Thailand, the monarchy is permanent, while constitutions are ephemeral.

Jurisprudence, Univ. Phillipines 1990), discussed in Ted L. McDorman, The 1991 Constitution of
Thailand, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL. J., 257, 263 (1995).
22
See McDorman, supra note 21, at 218; Samudavanija, supra note 12; see also Ted L. McDorman &
Margot Young, Constitutional Structures and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia,
Thailand and Vietnam, 47 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L. J. 85 (1998).
23
In a 1992 speech, he mischaracterized the United States as providing a constitutional right to welfare,
which he argued would not be fiscally sound if imported to Thailand. HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 344.
24
HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 434; see also Andrew Harding, Buddhism, Human Rights and Constitutional
Reform in Thailand 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. (2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/andrew_harding/1.
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Constitutions may not regulate the monarchy; nonetheless, they are used to legitimate
temporal power-holders.25
This constitutional scheme is workable in large part because the state is
autonomous and continues to function without much interference from the political
classes. Thailand has been influentially, if elliptically, described as a “bureaucratic
polity,” to emphasize the relative autonomy of the state and the idea that political
organization tends to occur in pervasive patron-client relations with state elites.26 The
political parties are viewed as almost parasitic on the society, using money to organize
their constituents rather than representing organic interests from the bottom up. There has
been limited local involvement in decision-making, as governors are appointed Ministry
of Interior bureaucrats. In short, Thailand’s stabilizing institutions—monarchy,
bureaucracy, and Buddhism—all derive their power from extraconstitutional sources and
are constrained by a set of informal norms rather than by formal rules.
One increasingly salient question is whether the unwritten constitutional rules
with the traditional monarch at the center are institutional in character or uniquely tied up
with the charismatic authority of Bhumibol Adulyadej.27 This issue is crucial, particularly
as a monarchical succession looms. The crown prince is widely believed to lack the
gravitas of his father, and so it is unclear whether he can use his power with sufficient
prudence so as to preserve it. While the issue is beyond the scope of this paper,
succession will provide a crucial test for the unwritten constitution.28

25

Samudavanija, supra note 12.
FRED RIGGS, THAILAND: MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY (1966).
27
SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 16, at 2, 20, 76.
28
HANDLEY, supra note 5 at 363; but see Ockey, supra note 18 (greater institutionalization).
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2. The 1997 Constitution
The Thai constitution of 1997 was a watershed in Thai politics, marking the first time that
a constitution was adopted with widespread public involvement.29 In 1991, one of the
country’s many coups had been triggered by intramilitary factional politics.30 Once in
power, the new leaders began to engineer constitutional reform to maintain power, and a
military man, General Suchinda, was elected as premier. Political parties protested, and
large demonstrations developed on the streets of Bangkok in May of 1992, demanding
broader constitutional reform and a return to democracy. These protests were met with
violence by the military. The crisis was averted only when the king remonstrated with the
military prime minister and the leader of civilian protests on television.
There followed an interim government of technocrats with some military
representation, charged with overseeing the eventual return to democracy. Initially, the
government sought to effectuate the transition through a constitutional amendment
process, but ultimately it was decided that an entirely new draft was needed.31 A drafting
commission, which included some elected members as well as appointed members,
produced proposals in 1995, but these were resisted by entrenched elements of the Thai

29

For general accounts, see Peter Leyland, The 2007 Constitution and the Continuing Quest For Good
Governance In Thailand (2001) (draft on file with author); Andrew Harding, May There Be Virtue: ‘New
Asian Constitutionalism’ in Thailand, 3 ASIAN L. 236, 241 (2001); Michael Connors, Framing the
‘People’s Constitution’, in REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra note 14, at 37 (critiquing NGOs but
essentially optimistic analysis); Duncan McCargo, Introduction, in REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra
note 14; see also Sombat Chantornvong, The 1997 Constitution and the Politics of Electoral Reform, in
REFORMING THAI POLITICS, supra note 14, at 203.
30
The coup followed rare public criticism of Western-style institutions by the king. HANDLEY, supra note
5, at 337–339; see generally Ted L. McDorman, Constitutional Change and Continuity in Thailand in the
Aftermath of the 1991 Coup, in ASIA-PACIFIC LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 218 (Douglas A. Johnson & Gerry
Ferguson, eds., Univ. British Columbia Press 1998).
31
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scene.32 The drafting commission consisted of widely respected academics, as well as
lawyers and other technocrats, but it had the support of the military.33
Despite the king’s call for a short, simple constitution,34 the final draft was
formidable: 336 articles and 142 pages in English translation.35 The process was designed
as a model of public involvement and deliberation, with extensive consultations and
education sessions. The adoption process, too, included the public as a backup option: the
constitution was to be adopted by the National Assembly, but if the assembly rejected the
draft, it would be put to public referendum, for the first time in Thai history. Huge public
discussions with t-shirts (green for supporting the constitution, yellow for opposition)
engendered public debate and discussion. In the end, the referendum was unnecessary, as
the National Assembly adopted the text amid great public support.
Many of the provisions of the 1997 document, such as the extensive list of rights,
were fairly standard. The real innovations were institutional and were characterized by
some as revolutionary in character.36 Designed to develop good governance and to
resolve Thailand’s longstanding political problems, the document cabins and regulates
the political process extensively.37 The main democratically elected body was the House
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of Representatives, selected using a mixed electoral system combining proportional
representation and a set of district-based constituencies using a first-past-the-post
system.38 House members were required to belong to political parties, and the
constitution provided that expulsion from a party required giving up one’s seat.39 This
innovation was designed to give party leaders control over their members and to
encourage party discipline. It also was designed to overcome chronic problems of partyswitching that had prevented the emergence of stable parties, as candidates would move
around depending on which party made the best offer.40
Besides the House, the legislature included an elected Senate, composed
exclusively of nonparty actors: anyone who had been a member of a political party for
the past twelve months was ineligible. Here we can see clearly the “post-political” quality
of the constitution: there was an assumption that parties were corruptive and that
nonparty members were somehow insulated from external pressures. Senators were
elected in single-vote, multimember districts, ensuring the representation of
nonmajoritarian interests. Candidates for Senate were restricted from campaigning41 and
could not run for reelection. The thought was that the Senate would attract local
personalities who already had grassroots support, and hence were unlikely to be
corrupted by the process of formal campaigning.
38

CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAIL. (1997) §§ 98, 99, 102 [hereinafter 1997 CONST.].
Id. § 118. The constitution also contained some paternalistic elements. MPs were required to have a
bachelor’s degree, an undemocratic requirement that Harding believes was nevertheless widely
supported. Andrew Harding, May There Be Virtue: ‘New Asian Constitutionalism’ in Thailand, 3 ASIAN
L. 236, 241 (2001). One effect of this restriction was to strengthen urbanites relative to traditional bosses
in the countryside.
40
One politician I spoke with recalled being asked to give a substantial amount of money to the party for a
seat on the party list. Presumably the rule preventing party-switching strengthened party bosses relative to
candidates, and would increase the price paid to parties, as opposed to parties paying candidates to join
them.
41
1997 CONST. § 129.
39
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As constituted, the Senate did not fully achieve the goal of a disinterested,
nonpartisan check on party politics in the House. One new phenomenon was that of the
“husband and wife” constituency, in which relatives of prominent politicians would run
in the same geographic areas for the “nonpartisan” Senate. Although the effort to
introduce technocratic and grassroots candidates to balance professional politicians was
unsuccessful, it did have some resonance in the Thai context. The nonpartisan Senate is
best understood as trying to steer a narrow course between the Scylla of military
intervention and the Charybdis of corrupt civilian politicians. In many previous
constitutions, the Senate had served as an appointed body to check an elected
legislature.42 In 1992, the Senate was designed to remain unelected so as to ensure a
military veto. The Senate can thus be seen as a guardian institution, rather than a channel
of democratic representation, much as the early U.S. Senate was seen as an elitist
repository of wisdom and defender of national interests against popular passions.43 The
1997 document marked a break by ensuring that it was constituted by the people rather
than appointed by the military, king, or government, and it did so in a way that made
sense in the context of local distrust of politicians and political parties.
The 2007 Constitution combined public election with elite selection of senators..44
As in the 1997 Constitution, Senators must, again, be 40 years old and hold a bachelor’s
degree.45 In addition, the elite selection committees—consisting of the presidents of
many of the guardian institutions and judges nominated by the Supreme and

42

E.g., HANDLEY, supra note 5, at 342; 1978 CONST. OF THAIL.
JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (Vintage 1996).
44
THAIL. CONST. 2007 §§ 111-113 [hereinafter 2007 CONST.]
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Id. at § 115; cf. 1997 CONST., § 125.
43
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Administrative Courts—will take into account nominations from academia and civil
society organizations.46
The nominally apolitical Senate was a linchpin institution in 1997, because of its
central role in appointing the various guardian institutions. The constitution included a
plethora of these: the Election Commission, Audit Commission, Human Rights
Commission, Ombudsman, Supreme Court (which included a special Criminal Division
for Persons Holding Political Office), Supreme Administrative Court, Constitutional
Court, and National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC).47 These were constituted
in a complex set of nested selection committees defined in the constitution itself. For
example, the NCCC was nominated by a fifteen-member selection committee, including
the presidents of the Supreme, Constitutional, and Supreme Administrative courts, which
submitted a list of names to be selected by the Senate.48 The Election Commission was
chosen by a special ten-member selection committee that included the presidents of the
Constitutional and Supreme Administrative Courts, four rectors of universities elected by
their fellow rectors, and four representatives of political parties that held seats in the
House.49 The 2007 document retains all of these bodies but simplifies the selection
committee structure. Instead of a specially constituted committee for each institution,
nominations are now chosen by a core group consisting of the presidents of the Supreme,
Supreme Administrative, and Constitutional Courts, along with the leader of the majority

46

2007 CONST., §§ 114. Interestingly, the Senate itself is involved in approving members of the guardian
committees. See, e.g., id. at §§ 206, 229, 242. Thus, there is a degree of circularity in the appointment
processes.
47
In addition, the Anti-Money-Laundering Office was established by statute in 1999.
48
1997 CONST. § 297.
49
Id. at § 138. The selections required a 3/4 majority, giving groups of politicians and academics the power
to veto nominations.
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and the opposition leader of the House of Representatives.50 The courts thus become the
guardians of the guardian institutions.
The Election Commission is tasked with supervising election campaigns and
executing electoral law. In 1997, it was a four-member body appointed by the Senate; the
2007 version had four members plus a chairman. The Election Commission powers are
extensive: it can annul election results, order new elections, and investigate fraud
allegations. It used these powers extensively during Senate elections in 2000 and 2001, as
well as in general elections in 2001, and, crucially, in 2005 and 2006 in the events
leading up to the military coup.51
Another guardian institution constitutionalized in 1997 was the National CounterCorruption Commission. Corruption has been endemic in Thailand, and the 1997
constitution sought to address this. The NCCC collects reports on assets from politicians
and senior bureaucrats to ensure that there are no mysterious increases during the time
they are in public service. Those who fail to report assets can be barred from office,
subject to approval by the new Constitutional Court.
Appointments to the NCCC in both 1997 and 2007 were similarly structured to
those on the Election Commission, with senatorial voting on candidates put forward by a
selection committee. In 1997, this selection committee itself included members of various
institutions and civil society, while the 2007 version is composed of the heads of the three
highest courts and two leaders of the House of Representatives.52 The NCCC members

51
52

In the 2000 Senate elections, seventy-eight candidates were disqualified.
Id. at § 246.
16

now serve for nine-year, nonrenewable terms (up from six) and may not hold other
positions.
Under the 1997 constitution, the Constitutional Court had a central role in policing
the other independent bodies.53 In addition to interpreting the constitution and resolving
jurisdictional disputes among governmental authorities, the Constitutional Court
exercised an array of ancillary powers. It could confirm findings of and evaluate
disclosures submitted to the NCCC, review whether any appropriations bill would lead to
involvement of an elected official in the expenditure of funds,54 determine whether an
emergency decree was warranted by a true emergency,55 determine whether election
commissioners should be disqualified,56 and decide whether political party regulations
violate the constitution or fundamental principles of Thai governance.57 Because of the
overarching concern with corruption that animated the 1997 constitution, the Court had
the power to demand documents or evidence to carry out its duties. In this sense, it was a
kind of inquisitorial Constitutional Court. It was the exercise of these powers that
embroiled the Court in controversy during the political crisis of 2006 discussed below,
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and, unsurprisingly, the 2007 document scales back the Court’s ancillary powers,58
restoring it to a more conventional role.
The creation in 1997 of a system of administrative courts to allow citizens to
challenge government action was an enormous innovation.59 Although given less
attention worldwide, the availability of judicial review of administrative action is in some
sense more important than constitutional review, in that most citizens encounter the state
in simple interactions that do not raise constitutional issues. This innovation was
particularly important in Thailand, where the state had traditionally been insulated from
public scrutiny.60 Analysts report that, even more than the Constitutional Court, the
Administrative Court has played a major role in structuring citizen-state relations since
1997 and is becoming an important arena.61 The court has issued a wide range of
judgments constraining the government at many levels. For example, in a well-known
case involving a government-chartered television station, ITV, Thaksin’s family was a
majority stakeholder and sought to renegotiate the licensing arrangement, which had been
issued by the prime minister’s office.62 Interestingly, the bureaucrats in the office
resisted, and the court sided with them against a company controlled by the sitting prime
minister himself. In another case in 2008, the court enjoined the foreign minister from
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taking action that might support Cambodia’s bid for UN funding for a contested border
temple.
These institutions, established in 1997, are all in some sense post-political. They
reflect the idea that democratic politics ought to be constrained and that the political
process cannot be trusted to ensure clean politics. This reflects long-standing Madisonian
themes in democratic theory, as filtered through the twentieth-century shift away from
parliamentary sovereignty. The Thai constitution is an extreme case, however, in its
efforts to insulate appointments and management of the “guardian institutions” from any
taint of political parties. In addition to having complex selection committees, the
apolitical Senate was a crucial veto gate for all the institutions. This no doubt reflects not
so much progressivism on the part of the drafters of the 1997 text but, rather, Thailand’s
long-standing ambivalence toward politics and politicians. Conservative forces have
always viewed democracy with some trepidation, and Thailand’s constitutional history is
replete with unelected legislative institutions appointed by elite bodies. The general
global trend toward guardian institutions interacts with a set of local elite and
technocratic values.

3. The Life and Death of the 1997 Constitution
After its adoption with widespread support, the 1997 constitution got off to an auspicious
start, as the complex set of institutions it inaugurated began to regulate politics. The Thai
Constitutional Court, for example, took up high-profile cases involving scrutiny of
politicians. In one such case, Sanan Kachornprasart, the minister of interior and deputy
prime minister, was found to have deliberately submitted a false statement of his assets to
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the NCCC. In August 2000, the Constitutional Court unanimously confirmed the report
of the NCCC, leading to a five-year ban from office for the prominent politician.63 By the
end of 2000, the Court had confirmed NCCC decisions in 17 cases.
Things began to change with the election of January 2001, which brought to
power Thaksin Shinawatra, who had built a fortune in the telecommunications business,
and then entered politics in 1994, becoming an MP and cabinet member in the early years
of return to democracy. Described as Thailand’s Silvio Berlusconi, Thaksin offered little
in the way of substantive policy, but he tapped into regional resentments and built a
following in the rural North and Northeast. Like his Italian counterpart, Thaksin has long
been linked with corruption, and, in early 2001, when he was the leading candidate for
prime minister, he was found to have registered his assets in the names of various
household staff and business colleagues. When Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party
subsequently won the elections, the Constitutional Court was placed in a difficult
position; it was called on to confirm the NCCC decision, which would have banned
Thaksin from politics for five years. In a divided decision that has been described as
confused, the Court found that the false report had not been filed deliberately, and
thereby allowed Thaksin to assume the office of prime minister. This result was reached
by deciding two separate issues: first, that Thaksin was not required to file an asset report
and second, that his false report had been inadvertent.64 The Court decided each issue
against Thaksin but, in accordance with its odd voting rules, aggregated the pro-Thaksin
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votes on the two issues against the affirmative votes in the first case, allowing the clear
winner of the election to take power.
Thus began a long chapter that ultimately led to the constitution’s demise.
Thaksin subsequently consolidated his power, acquiring political parties by merger and
acquisition, and securing Thailand’s first ever single-party majority government in 2001.
Despite (or perhaps due to) a more active Election Commission, the price of vote-buying
went up during this election. Yet the Election Commission disqualified only two
candidates out of 312 against whom complaints were lodged. Gradually, Thaksin began
to influence all the independent political institutions, including the Constitutional Court
and those designed to prevent corruption. He did this through a combination of
appointments, intimidation, and bribery, particularly focusing on the Senate, which
played the linchpin role in appointments. Eventually, all the institutions succumbed to his
pressure; among the people he appointed to the Election Commission, for example, was a
general who had himself been disqualified by the commission.65 Those who were not
cowed were not reappointed.
To be fair, the oversight institutions were not completely pro-Thaksin. The
Constitutional Court ruled that a couple of his appointments, including the Election
Commission and the auditor general, had not followed proper procedure.66 The NCCC
was celebrated by some as being particularly effective, but came under severe attack in
2005, when it awarded itself a significant salary increase without parliamentary
scrutiny.67 The Criminal Division of the Supreme Court ruled that the nine
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commissioners violated the law, and removed them from office. New appointments were
not forthcoming, so the commission became dormant. All in all, the general perception
was that the independent agencies did not function as they should have.
Thaksin’s first term was marked by the disappearance of up to 3,000 suspected
drug dealers, as well as a confrontational attitude toward renewed Muslim insurrection in
the South of the country. He also was accused by critics of overriding the constitution by
declaring a state of emergency in the South. When the Human Rights Commission
complained, the prime minister attacked it in the media, although he did modify the
emergency decree.68 In January 2005, Thaksin won reelection when his party captured an
overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats, making it impossible for the opposition to
mount a vote of no confidence.
Eventually, Thaksin’s heavy-handed tactics prompted domestic opposition, first
from fellow elites such as media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul, who eventually made
claims that Thaksin sought to overthrow the monarchy.69 Only when Thaksin passed a
series of laws that allowed him to sell his company, Shin Corporation, to a Singapore
entity in early 2006 for $1.9 billion without paying taxes, however, did the middle class
of Bangkok withdraw its support. Thaksin was sued for alleged corruption and electoral
violations, and was charged with spending an estimated $260 million in bribes to voters
in the campaign.70 Because the NCCC was not in operation, the case went before the
Constitutional Court, which, true to its pro-Thaksin reputation, found that there was no
justiciable case.
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With no help from any political institutions, anti-Thaksin members of the public
began to demonstrate in the streets, calling for his resignation or impeachment,
particularly in the wake of the sale of Shin Corporation. Thaksin then dissolved
parliament and called a snap election for April 2, 2006, but the opposition chose to
boycott it, saying Thaksin should step down first. The election went forward, but because
of irregularities and the boycott, failed to produce a clear result.71 At this point, on April
26, 2006, the king met with the leaders of the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme
Administrative courts and publicly called for them to resolve the constitutional crisis,
suggesting they should void the April election. The Constitutional Court responded by
annulling the election; three election commissioners were jailed, on the grounds that the
time allowed for the campaign had been too brief and that some polling booths had been
positioned to allow others to view the ballots as they were cast. Five new election
commissioners, who had just been chosen after months of deadlock, would be replaced.
Nevertheless, with political institutions at a standstill, the appointment process could
hardly operate effectively. The Constitutional Court seemed to have failed to resolve the
problem completely. This is a paradigmatic example of the politicization of the judiciary
that post-political constitutions risk by placing great power in the hands of guardians.
Still, there seemed to be light at the end of the tunnel. A November election was
expected to produce valid results at last.72 Then, however, Thaksin began to interfere with
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the military, promoting his own cohorts in the military hierarchy and replacing those
associated with Privy Councilor Prem Tinsulanonda, a retired general and former prime
minister. Public demonstrations intensified in the fall; as Thaksin prepared to hold new
elections, the military stepped in.
Thus the Thai constitution of 1997 died a peaceful death at the age of nine. The
sources of its failure were not congenital but, rather, reflected the difficulty of designing
any institutional solution to governance problems in a country as corrupt as Thailand,
particularly with a billionaire prime minister willing to bribe any and all in his pursuit of
power. However, Thaksin was only the precipitating cause. Deeper problems of political
institutions remain, impervious to formal solutions.

4. The Interim Constitution
Speculation on motives for the 2006 coup abound. Some believe that it was designed to
prevent an outbreak of violence that might have emerged during demonstrations and
counterdemonstrations over Thaksin’s campaign the following weekend. Perhaps more
plausibly, Thaksin’s attempt to promote his own classmates in the military command
structure triggered a counter-reaction from another class of military commanders—
intermilitary factional disputes had been the basis for many a coup and failed coup
previously. No doubt deeper tensions in civil-military relations, over the conflict in the
South, also helped lay the groundwork for the coup.73 Rumors also allege that Thaksin’s
wealth had found its way into the royal family itself, as he sought to corrupt certain
members.

73

Ockney, supra note 74, at 137.
24

The coup leaders followed a venerable tradition of blaming civilian corruption for
the need to step in. They promptly appointed a government led by former army
commander Surayud Chulanond. Crucially, the coup leaders kept alive most of the
independent commissions, although the interim constitution does not so stipulate.74 The
only major institutional reform is that the interim constitution takes judicial review from
the Constitutional Court and sets up a Constitutional Committee, consisting of the chair
of the Supreme Court and the chair of the Administrative Court, along with five justices
of the Supreme Court elected by their colleagues.75 No doubt this reflects disappointment
in the Constitutional Court that had allowed Thaksin to take power in the first place and
later seemed to serve his interests.
The interim constitution outlined a process for constitutional reform and promised
wide public participation.76 It set up a Constitutional Drafting Assembly and a 100member nonpartisan Constitutional Drafting Commission to be selected by the coup
leaders from a larger group.77 Actual drafting was done by a subcommittee of 35,
consisting of 25 persons from the Drafting Commission along with 10 appointed by the
coup leaders, chaired by Prasong Soonsiri, a veteran ally of Prem. The 1997 constitution
was to be treated as a default, with the drafters required to explain any deviations from
it.78 In this way, the coup leaders signaled their commitment to set politics aside, ensure
some institutional continuity, and provide an anchor for the drafting process. There does
not appear to be formal precedent in Thailand for this kind of constitutional anchoring,
74
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though research on drafting processes is limited, and we do not know what happens
behind the closed doors of the drafting room.
Drafting was followed by consultation with a wide range of institutions,
presentation to the king, and a public referendum. Should the referendum have voted the
Constitution down, the government and national assembly were to select a previous
constitution to be used as the new constitution. Either way, elections were to be held
within 45 days. In an interesting innovation, members of the Constitutional Drafting
Assembly are not allowed to run for election for two years after completing their duties.79
The coup leaders also took steps to punish Thaksin and ensure that he would not
return to political life, extending the investigation that had begun under the 1997
constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal under the interim constitution heard a trial for
fraud and found the Thai Rak Thai party liable on corruption charges in May 2007,
forcing it to disband and banning many of its leaders from office for five years. A
separate process ordered the seizure of Thaksin's assets and issued arrest warrants for him
and his wife, who eventually was convicted of tax fraud and sentenced to prison. At this
writing, Thaksin and his wife are in exile in London.

5. Constitutional Afterlife? The 2007 Constitution
In April 2007, a provisional draft of the new Constitution was released, and in keeping
the coup leaders’ timetable, was approved in August by a referendum, with a majority of
58 percent. This marked the first ever referendum held on a constitution in Thailand; the
1997 constitution had promoted the idea but not actually utilized it. The draft document
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largely followed the 1997 constitution, although it contained a number of controversial
new provisions; public debate forced the drafters to scale back some of the latter.80
Among other things, the 2007 Constitution reinstated the Constitutional Court and again
gave it extensive ancillary powers, including policing political parties,81 removal from
office of members of parliament and ministers,82 approval of disqualification of election
commissioners,83 approval of organic laws for important institutions,84 approval of
challenges to emergency decrees,85 and a role for its chairman in committees that select
senators. The other watchdog institutions also were retained, with slightly streamlined
appointment procedures.86
One of the areas in which the 1997 text will have influence is criminal procedure.
The 1997 document introduced many radical changes, including requiring judicially
issued warrants for arrests;87 demanding speedy consideration of reasonable bail;88
proclaiming the right to a speedy, continuous, and fair trial;89 guaranteeing the right to a
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lawyer during interrogation;90 and establishing witness and victim protection.91 These
provisions provoked a major revision to the country’s criminal procedure code and the
passage of other laws to effect these changes.92 The expansive list of human rights, too, is
retained in the 2007 document, with only minor reorganization and reformulation.93
Other innovations concern the prime minister, who must be an elected member of
the House and may not serve more than two four-year terms.94 Perhaps the major
distinction between the 1997 and 2007 documents is that the latter reverts, in part, to an
appointed Senate.95 The attraction of a paternalistically selected upper house as a check
on “ordinary” electoral politics remains strong in Thailand, where politicians are
distrusted but the military is considered unfit for long-term rule. The half-appointed
current Senate will retain its status as an elite check on partisan politics; it remains to be
seen whether it will perform any more admirably in this role than its elected
predecessor.96
These institutional revisions notwithstanding, the core institutional structures
remain substantially the same. The 1997 constitution, though it died at the tender age of
nine, will have lasting impact on Thai politics in the core area of restraints on
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government. In this sense, the 1997 constitution continues, in its afterlife, to constitute a
critical juncture in Thailand’s long and tumultuous political history.97 Only time will tell
if these seeds of constitutionalism are in fact rendered effective.
In this regard, the choice of the coup leaders to allow some institutional continuity
is a sound one. Successful written constitutions depend on an array of informal
understandings, including the development of institutional reputations that can ensure
effectiveness. Many of the post-political institutions of 1997 did contribute significantly
to effective governance. The Administrative Court, for example, is a great success story,
voted “independent institution of the year” in a public opinion poll.98 The Human Rights
Commission devised solutions for easing tensions in southern Thailand—including the
idea of an apology and greater autonomy—that laid the groundwork for the military
government’s peace-building initiatives there. Institutional continuity will allow these
bodies to build on past successes, and help to develop effective power in the future.
Thus, the 1997 constitution promises to have a longer afterlife than its short life might
lead one to believe.

6. The Institutions Bite Back
In December 2007, elections were held as initially promised by the coup leaders.
Thaksin’s banned Thai Rak Thai party had regrouped under the banner of the People’s
Power Party (PPP) and won a plurality, securing 233 of the 480 seats. Thus, the coup
leaders’ worst nightmare materialized: the party associated with Thaksin had prevailed,
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and was able, eventually, to form a government headed by Samak Sundaravej, an oldtime politician hand-picked by Thaksin.99 Popular protests, supported by the disaffected
middle class, ensued, along with counterdemonstrations in support of the government.
These have continued throughout the summer of 2008, erupting in violence in September
and October.
While much of the conflict has played out in the streets, the balance of power
between the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces is also being determined by the increasingly
assertive independent agencies held over from the 1997 constitution. In particular, the
Election Commission and the courts played a crucial role in policing the election, finding
substantial irregularities in its conduct after receiving more than 940 complaints.100
The Election Commission banned the designated speaker of the new parliament
from politics for campaign irregularities. This raised the specter of the disbanding of the
entire PPP, since Thai law allows parties to be disbanded by the Constitutional Court on
recommendation of the Election Commission if a party officer is convicted (by the
Supreme Court) of electoral wrongdoing that benefited the party.101 In early December,
the Court ruled against the PPP, forcing its members to reorganize.102
The courts were also the site of battles over Prime Minister Samak. Responding to
a complaint submitted by the unelected Senate, the Constitutional Court ruled in
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September 2008 that Samak had violated Thai law by serving as the host of a television
cooking program and had to resign the premiership. The PPP threatened to renominate
him, but ultimately he was replaced by Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law.
Protests, however, continued, and Somchai was himself accused of constitutional
violations that would disqualify him from office. As protests grew more violent, a state of
emergency was called. With the ruling against the PPP, Somchai would likely be banned
from politics, resolving the immediate political crisis, but perpetuating uncertainty.
Conclusion
The relatively short-lived 1997 constitution has wrought profound changes in the
structure of Thai politics. Increasingly, the key players in Thailand are a handful of
technocratic institutions whose role is to guard against the alleged excesses of partisan
politics. It is well understood that the shift in constitutional power to unelected bodies
poses challenges to conventional democratic theory.103 Unelected technocratic guardians
are deciding who governs and how they can do so, and it is only a slight exaggeration to
say that Thailand has been living with a continuous case of Bush v. Gore104 since 2001.
The Thai case illustrates another consequence of the shift, namely that the technocratic
institutions are themselves transformed by their new, high-profile mandates. The
apparently post-political structure masks judicialized politics, and the guardians have
inevitably been politicized as they are called on to determine who will govern. Many of
the controversies will wind up in the courts, which will be called on to sort out the
intricate institutional boundaries of the post-political Constitution. But the courts and
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guardian institutions alone seem unable to ultimately resolve the ongoing political
conflict in what has become a divided society.
One reason that the constitutional institutions have emerged in center stage is
similar to that found in other accounts of judicialization.105 In a society divided among
political forces of roughly equal weight, there is a functional demand for dispute
resolution, particularly involving fiercely contested electoral politics. Thailand’s crisis
pits a traditional elite and urban middle class against a populist, billionaire-led movement
representing the country’s rural poor. Because the political conflict has endured over
multiple constitutions, institutional continuity of the dispute resolution machinery has
served the interests of all sides.
In the context of Thailand, there is another element at play, which is the
relationship between the new guardian institutions and the unwritten constitution.
Thailand’s unwritten constitutional norms focus on the role of the monarch, whose
effectiveness as mediator depends in large part on his reluctance to utilize his power. Few
believe the monarchy is truly neutral in the present political conflict: indeed, the queen
herself took the highly unusual step of presiding over the funeral of an antigovernment
protester in October 2008, a move seen by some as sanctioning the demonstrations. But
the monarchy as an institution depends for its legitimacy on its reluctance to descend to
the political sphere too frequently. The monarch must remain the transcendent symbol of
all Thais. The guardian institutions can reinforce this role by serving as the primary
arenas of political conflict, performing a front-line role in resolving crises. It would not
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be accurate to say that the guardian institutions are serving as the proxy of the throne—
they generally seem to decide the cases before them in a more or less neutral manner. But
the impact of these guardian institutions is to check and limit electoral politics, and this is
consistent with the traditional royalist view of politicians as self-interested. The guardians
thus reinforce the unwritten constitutional norms surrounding the monarchy, preserving it
as the ultimate guardian and relieving pressures that might otherwise threaten its position.
The foregoing analysis suggests a generalizable hypothesis for the existence of
constitutional afterlife. In environments of frequent constitutional turnover, unwritten
rules may play an especially important role in stabilizing politics and providing order.
But the innovations of written constitutions may also, sometimes, endure across iterations
of formal enactment. The hypothesis is that such innovations will be effective and endure
so long as they are consistent with and reinforce the unwritten constitution. Where
innovations clash with the norms of the unwritten constitution, they will not find
sufficient support to be retained across multiple written constitutions. This suggests that
constitutions that initially appear ineffective and ephemeral can in fact have an impact
beyond their own lifespan. They can create enduring institutions, but also reinforce
unwritten norms that provide stability.

Even after its demise in 2006, the structure wrought in 1997 has remained in
place, enjoying a constitutional afterlife. The Thai example forces us to think about
constitutional change as an iterative process. For most countries, constitutional reform is
occurs periodically: the average person outside of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries will live under several constitutions in the course of
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a lifetime.106 Understanding the effect of a particular set of constitutional provisions
requires looking not only at their immediate implementation and efficacy, but also at
institutional changes that they bring about, which may persist well into the future, and at
their impact on unwritten constitutional norms. The true significance of a constitution
may not be a matter of whom it empowers, or what formal restraints it provides, or even
whether its provisions are implemented. Constitutions are moments of institutional
innovation and recalibration, and set in motion processes that can endure beyond the
formal texts, which are all too ephemeral.
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